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Arguments for eliminating the double taxation of dividends apply only to dividends paid by
corporations to individuals. The double (and multiple) taxation of dividends paid by one firm to
another – intercorporate dividends - was explicitly included in the 1930s to eliminate pyramidal
corporate groups. These structures exist elsewhere, and are associated with corporate governance
problems, corporate tax avoidance, and a greater concentration of economic power than is currently
possible in the United States. Current US tax reform proposals do not distinguish dividends paid to
individuals from intercorporate dividends and, by eliminating double taxation on both sorts of
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1.    Introduction 
The double taxation of intercorporate dividends was introduced in the 1930s to render economically 
unviable certain corporate structures which were believed to facilitate governance problems, tax 
avoidance, and highly concentrated corporate control 
    The structures in question are corporate groups, clusters of seemingly separate firms 
connected by complicated networks of intercorporate equity ownership.  The most common of these 
structures is the pyramidal corporate group, in which a wealthy family or individual typically 
controls a family firm, which controls majority voting blocks in several other firms, with public 
shareholders holding the remaining shares.  Each of these firms, in turn, holds majority voting 
blocks of more companies, again with public investors holding the remaining shares. Each of these 
controls yet more firms, and so on ad valorem.   Such structures can encompass hundreds of 
nominally separate publicly traded and private firms, and can be more than a dozen layers deep.  
Pyramidal corporate groups allow wealthy individuals or families to control corporate assets worth 
vastly more than their actual wealth.  They are the structures that permit a tiny elite to control the 
greater parts of the corporate sectors in many countries.   
Pyramidal groups may serve useful purposes in countries with malfunctioning markets.  
Group member firms can transact business with each other while avoiding the dysfunctional 
institutions of countries in early stages of economic development.  However, the social welfare value 
of pyramidal groups in developed economies is uncertain at best.    
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This is because pyramid group member firms have been shown to shift assets and income 
among themselves, much as do the subsidiaries of multinational firms.  This income shifting has two 
probable objectives.  First, pyramid group companies can use such intercorporate income shifting 
techniques, such as the manipulation of transfer price, to enhance their income tax avoidance efforts. 
 The economic importance of this sort of income shifting in countries with extensive pyramidal 
groups is little studied, though Congress apparently felt it to be a major problem in the 1930s.   
Second, pyramid group firms can use such intercorporate income shifting to transfer income and 
assets away from firms whose cash flows largely accrue to public investors and into firms whose 
cash flow largely accrue to a controlling shareholder.  Substantial empirical evidence now supports 
the economic importance of this sort of income shifting in countries with extensive pyramidal 
groups.     
Pyramidal corporate groups also allow highly concentrated corporate control.  The 
shareholder who controls the apex firm in the pyramid indirectly controls all the other firms in the 
pyramid.  These can collectively be worth vastly more than her personal fortune.  This feature of 
pyramidal groups lets a handful of families control the greater part of the corporate sectors of many 
developing countries.    
Dividends from firms low in such pyramidal structures must be relayed through a chain of to 
the controlling shareholder.  If dividend taxes accrue at the corporate level each time the dividend is 
passed from one firm to the next, as US “double taxation” of dividends currently mandates, such 
pyramidal structures are prohibitively expensive.  However, pyramidal business group structures can 
be assembled readily in countries that tax dividend income only once.   
An explicit purpose of President Roosevelt’s 1933 and 1934 tax reforms was the extension of 
double taxation to intercorporate dividends to force the dismantling of pyramidal groups.  The  
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reforms were successful, for such structures are currently unknown in the United States.  However, 
with the passage of time, the economic rational underlying this particular aspect of dividend double 
taxation has also been forgotten.   
Other regulatory and legal constraints, such as the Public Utilities Holding Company Act, 
might limit income shifting by pyramidal groups in the United States, should they reappear after the 
elimination of all double taxation of dividend income.  Additional diligence by tax authorities and 
alertness by corporate governance watchdogs might well serve.  However, both the efficacy of these 
constraints and the potential costs of such added diligence to taxpayers and investors are difficult to 
predict.   
Strong economic arguments suggest abolishing the double taxation of dividends paid to 
individuals.  However, these arguments have no application whatsoever to dividends paid by one 
corporation to another.   Nonetheless, the current tax reform proposal fails to distinguish dividends 
paid to individuals from dividends paid by one firm to another.    
The purpose of this paper is to highlight this distinction.  The original intent of Congress and 
the White House in applying double taxation to intercorporate dividends may well remain 
economically important, despite the validity of current arguments against double taxation of 
dividends paid to individuals.  Appreciating this distinction may allow nuanced reforms that 
eliminate the problems of the current US dividend double taxation without recreating the problems 
that led to the reforms of the 1930s.    
If the elimination of all dividend double taxation is enacted, and pyramidal groups form 
again in the United States for the first time since the 1930s, economists will have a fascinating new 
phenomenon to study.  Moreover, the potentially deleterious social welfare consequences of such a 
resurgence suggest an urgent need for additional study of this long-forgotten (in the U.S.)  
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phenomenon. 
The structure of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 describes pyramidal corporate groups, the 
structures of corporate ownership typical in most countries.  Section 3 explains how the US tax code, 
by subjecting intercorporate dividends to double taxation, renders such groups unviable.  Section 4 
describes how the US tax reforms of the 1930s introduced double taxation of intercorporate 
dividends explicitly to undermine pyramidal groups, which until then had been important in that 
country.  Section 5 reviews the current literature on pyramidal corporate groups outside the United 
States and assesses corporate governance, tax avoidance, and political economy implications of 
these structures.  Section 6 reviews arguments regarding the elimination of double dividend taxation, 
and shows how these arguments apply only to dividends paid by firms to individuals, and have no 
relevance to intercorporate dividends.  Section 7 concludes.   
 
2.  Examples of Pyramidal Corporate Groups 
Figure 1 illustrates a stylized pyramidal corporate group.  A family firm owns 51% of firm A, 
which owns 51% of Firm B, which owns 51% or firm C, and so on.  In practice, the situation is 
usually more complicated, with non-voting and multiple-voting shares, golden shares, cross-
holdings, and other additional ornaments.  Figure 2 illustrates a part of an actual Canadian pyramidal 
corporate group, the Hees-Edper Group.  The full group cannot be graphed here, as it is sixteen 
layers high and contains several hundred firms.  This group is unusually large, but its structure is 
typical of the pyramidal corporate groups that dominate the economies of most countries.   
It is possible to represent all the firms in smaller groups in other countries in a single 
diagram.  Thus, Figure 3 sketches the structure of the Anglo-American Group of South Africa as it  
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appeared in the mid 1990s.  The group consists of a mixture of publicly traded controlled 
corporations and private corporations, and deviates from a simple pyramidal structure in that many 
controlled corporations own blocks of stock in the companies that control them, indirectly or 
directly.  Figure 4 sketches the Italian companies controlled by the Agnelli family via a pyramidal 
group structure, and Figure 5 sketches the firms in the Deutsche Bank’s pyramidal group in 
Germany.  These structures are simpler than Anglo-American, and closer to the archetypal 
pyramidal form of Figure 1 and Figure2.   
Note that, while the statistical evidence discussed below associates pyramidal corporate 
groups with potential tax avoidance, corporate governance, and concentrated control problems, some 
pyramidal groups show no evidence of such problems at all.   For example, Daniels et al. (1995) find 
no evidence whatsoever of poor corporate governance or any other problems in the Hees-Edper 
pyramidal group. There is also no evidence of any problems in the Anglo-American Group, Agnelli 
Group, or Deutsche Bank Group.  These structures are displayed only to illustrate the general nature 
of pyramidal groups, in order to set the stage for considering possible problems in other similarly 
structured groups.    
While La Porta et al. (1999) show pyramidal corporate groups are the most common 
ownership structure in most countries, they are not the only corporate group.  For example, large 
Japanese corporations are organized into keiretsu, corporate groups in which each member firm 
owns a small equity stake in every other member firm.  Although each individual intercorporate 
equity stake is tiny, a majority of the stock in each keiretsu firm is held collectively by all the other 
firms in its group.  Morck and Nakamura (1999) discuss the historical transformation of family 
controlled pyramids into keiretsu in Japan, and show how keiretsu engender corporate governance 
problems.    
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In contrast to all of the above structures, Figure 6 illustrates the much simpler structure 
typical of the domestic operations of most large US corporations.  The Minnesota based company 
3M, formerly Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Corporation, is more than 99% owned by public 
shareholders, including individuals and investment funds.  As of its most recent SEC proxy filing, 
corporate insiders own about 1.5 million of 3M’s approximately 390 million outstanding shares – a 
combined stake of less than one percent.  The firm’s largest shareholder is State Street, an 
investment management firm, which holds about 30 million shares, roughly 7.7%.   The firm has no 
publicly traded domestic subsidiaries.  While Holderness et al. (1999) and others show that 
moderately large shareholders have been and remain important in many U.S. firms; the widely 
dispersed ownership structure of 3M is quite typical of the largest US firms.  And multiple layers of 
intercorporate ownership encompassing large numbers of publicly traded firms, such as those shown 
in Figures 2 through 5, are essentially unknown in the US.
1    
La Porta et al. (1999) show such that most large corporations in most countries are members 
of pyramidal groups.  Indeed, the United States (and United Kingdom) are highly unusual in that 
their large corporations are mostly freestanding independent entities.   
 
3.    How Double Taxation of Intercorporate Dividends Crumbles Pyramids 
The United States subjects dividends to ‘double taxation’, in the sense that ‘dividends 
received’ are taxable income for recipients and ‘dividends paid’ are part of taxable income for the 
payer.  Where the dividends are paid by corporations to individuals, this has the effect of raising the 
                                                           
1 The only U.S. exception I have discovered is a Massachusetts venture capital firm called Thermo Electron, which 
retains stakes in publicly traded high tech firms as an intermediate step to spinning them off.  This results in a two-tiered 
pyramid, which is still much simpler than the structures typical in other countries.   I am grateful to Martin Feldstein for 
bringing Thermo Electron to my attention.    
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true rate of taxation on dividends, which combines the rates paid by the recipient and the payer.  
This effect has received considerable attention, which is summarized in section 6.   
However, a second and lesser known aspect of US double dividend taxation is that it also 
subjects dividends paid by one firm to another to double taxation – though at lower rates.  This 
taxation of intercorporate dividends makes pyramidal corporate groups financially unviable.   
To see this, compare the details of US tax law and the tax law of Canada, which does not 
subject intercorporate dividends to double taxation.   Table 1 shows that both countries tax dividends 
when they are initially paid out by a company and when they are received by individuals.  The 
Canadian tax rate on dividend income, 31.34%, is lower than the tax rate on general income, 
46.41%.  This reflects a partial credit for taxes already paid by the corporation that initiated the 
dividend.   
Where the tax codes of the two countries differ starkly is in their treatment of dividends paid 
by one corporation to another.  Although the United States tax rate on dividend income received by 
corporations is substantially lower than that on dividend income received by individuals, it is 
positive unless the intercorporate stake is 80% ownership or higher.  In contrast, Canadian 
intercorporate dividends are entirely tax-exempt if the intercorporate stake is 10% or more.  When a 
corporation receives a dividend from another corporation, in which it owns a common equity stake 
of 10% or more, the Canadian tax authorities regards this as an internal transfer of funds in a 
corporate group, not as taxable income paid by one legal person to another.
2   
To see the importance of this difference, return to Figure 1. If the pyramidal group depicted 
                                                           
2There are two main exceptions to this rule.  The first is a complex set of rules for preferred shares and the second 
declares dividends paid to corporate investors that do not exercise control (stake < 10%) to be taxable income for those 
investors.    
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in that figure were in the US, a dividend paid by firm F would be subject to a 35% tax as part of that 
firm’s taxable income.  As the dividend passed up through the pyramid, it would be subject to a 
seven per cent tax at each level.  Finally, the controlling shareholder of the apex firm would pay a 
38.6% personal income tax on dividends received. Consequently, the effective tax rate on dividends 
the family receives from the firms in level F of its pyramid is 1 – [(1 – 0.35) x (1 - .07)
5 x (1 - .386)] 
= 72.2%.  The more layers in the pyramid, the higher is the effective tax on the controlling 
shareholder’s final dividend income.  If the dividend had been paid directly to an individual, the tax 
rate would have been 1 – [(1 – 0.35) x (1 - .386)] = 60.1%.  The penalty for the pyramidal structure 
is an extra 12.1% added to the marginal tax rate on dividends received by the controlling 
shareholder.  In essence, double taxation becomes ‘multiple taxation’, with the dividend subjected to 
taxation as it passes through each link in the chain of companies from firm F to the controlling 
shareholder.   
In contrast, the same pyramid in Canada would subject the same dividend only to a corporate 
income tax of 38.62% when paid out by Firm F and a 31.34% personal income tax when received by 
the controlling shareholder.
3    The combined rate is 1 – [(1 – 0.3862) x (1 – 0.3134)] = 57.86%.  
This combined rate does not depend on how many layers the pyramid contains.   There is no tax 
penalty to the controlling shareholder in Canada for funneling the dividend through a long sequence 
of corporations, and multilayered pyramidal corporate groups are consequently commonplace in that 
country.   
Table 2 lists effective intercorporate dividend tax rates for 1997, along with a 
characterization of the ownership structure of large firms in each country.  The ownership structure 
                                                           
3 The precise rates depend on the province.  Those shown are for Ontario.  Rates are substantially lower in Alberta and 
higher in Québec and the Atlantic provinces.    
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characterization variable is constructed as follows:  For each country, the names of the top ten 
businesses are obtained.  The ownership structures of these businesses, beginning with the largest, 
are tracked back through holding companies and other intermediate owners to the ultimate owners, 
as in La Porta et al. (1999).  As soon as one pyramidal structure is found, ‘yes’ is entered.  
Pyramidal structures include those controlled by wealthy families, individuals, governments, and 
widely held firms.  In addition, if intercorporate cross holdings of the sort described above in 
connection with Japanese keiretsu are found, ‘yes’ is also entered.  If none of these structures are 
found in connection with any top ten firm in the country, ‘no’ is entered.
4   
Table 2 shows that of the 33 countries for which data are available, only the United States 
levies a tax on intercorporate dividends.  (India and Korea have statutory taxes on intercorporate 
dividends, but exempt firms on special lists.  These lists include all the firms in major established 
pyramidal groups.  These taxes may, however, deter the rise of new rival groups.) It also shows 
corporate groups, pyramidal or otherwise, controlling top firms in every country except the United 
States and the United Kingdom.  The pattern in Table 2 is consistent with intercorporate dividend 
taxation in the United States rendering pyramidal and other corporate groups economically 
infeasible.  
The absence of corporate groups in the United Kingdom is perhaps a vestige of 
intercorporate dividend taxation, which apparently prevailed in that country until 1973 – see King 
(1977).  However, Aganin and Volpin (1998) show that Italy also abolished the double taxation of 
intercorporate dividends in 1977 and subsequently saw an increased use of pyramidal corporate 
groups.  A cross section of intercorporate dividend tax rates for 1983, the first year for which data 
comparable to those in Table 2 are available, reveals Belgium, France, Greece, and Portugal also 
                                                           
4 La Porta et al. (1999) kindly made their raw data available to us as a starting point for this exercise.  
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taxing intercorporate dividends.5  These countries subsequently ceased taxing intercorporate 
dividend income, and currently have pyramidal corporate groups. 
Why pyramidal groups failed to resurge in the United Kingdom when double taxation of 
intercorporate dividends ended, but rebounded in other countries that effected similar tax reforms is 
puzzling.   LaPorta et al. (1999) propose that strong investor protection may limit controlling 
shareholders’ ability to extract private benefits.  The substantial legal rights British shareholders 
enjoy might thus serve to render such groups less useful to rapacious insiders there than in Italy and 
other countries with weaker investor protection.  However, pyramids resurged in Italy after the 1977 
despite a simultaneous tightening of securities rules. Another possibility is that vigorous 
enforcement of the tax code in the UK prevents controlling shareholders from tunneling, and thus, 
again, limits their ability to extract private benefits of control.  This is consistent with Dyck and 
Zinglales (2001) and Nenova (2000), who report relatively small private benefits of control in the 
United Kingdom.  However, other countries with strong investor protection rules and well-
functioning legal and tax collection systems, including Australia and Canada, have extensive 
pyramidal corporate groups.  It may be that other features of the United Kingdom’s legal and 
regulatory system deter pyramidal groups in ways not currently understood.    
Further work on the relationship between intercorporate dividend taxation and the viability of 
pyramidal groups in different countries at different points in time is clearly needed to inform current 
tax reform discussion in the US.   
 
4.   The History of Intercorporate Dividend Taxation in the United States 
Pyramidal corporate groups were commonplace in the United States in the 1920s.  The 
                                                           
5 Though these countries may have exempted large established corporate groups.    
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largest US pyramids, which were built around power companies, encompassed hundreds of firms 
and were as many as ten layers high.
6  In 1928, the Federal Trade Commission issued a report on 
abusive practices of pyramids.  Noting widespread instances of tunneling, poor governance, and 
monopolistic practices, the report stated that pyramidal groups were "frequently a menace to the 
investor or the consumer or both."
 7  Following the 1929 market crash, many of these pyramidal 
groups defaulted on their debts.
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Intercorporate dividends taxation was introduced in the United States in 1935 with the 
explicit objective of breaking up pyramidal groups. Blakey and Blakey (1935) summarize the 
Roosevelt tax reform of 1935, which proposed intercorporate dividend taxes at 15% of the normal 
dividend tax rate as a measure to “prevent the evasion through affiliates” of the corporate income 
tax.  They note that “the tax would vary from 1
1/2 per cent to 2
5/8 per cent” for an individual 
company, but that “[i]n the case of pyramided complex holding companies, such taxes might amount 
to 8 or 10 per cent.”   
Robert Jackson, Assistant General Counsel to the Treasury Department, presenting the 
reforms to the Senate Finance Committee, “stressed the secondary effects of such taxes on dividends 
in discouraging undesirable practices of holding companies” (pyramidal groups), and discussed 
some such problems in detail:   
“The tax problems arising out of systems of holding companies, subholding companies, 
operating companies, and mixed companies, are very serious. For example, one such system 
as of December 31, 1933, contained approximately 270 companies of which 128 were public 
utility operating companies located in several and widely separated states, and at least 31 of 
which would be classed as subholding companies. The corporation filed consolidated returns 
showing no tax due in any of the years 1929 through 1933. The system was not so modest 
about its profits in its reports to stockholders, and the Bureau began the task of audit. The 
auditing to date has required the services of 108 field agents for an aggregate period of 
                                                           
6 Abel (1999).   
7 FTC, Utility Corporation, Senate Document No. 92, 70th Congress, 1st session. (1928). 
8 Philips (1993) p. 239.  
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11,488 days, the service of 16 auditors for a period of 2,640 days, as well as the services of 
the supervising staff. The task is not yet nearing satisfactory completion. The investigation is 
complicated by the great volume of security transactions among the different companies of 
the group. In some instances securities were transferred through as many as 10 intermediary 
companies on the way from starting point to destination. A dollar of earnings would likewise 
run through several companies before reaching a resting place. 
  “Some of these holding companies have imposed charges upon underlying operating 
utilities for the income-tax liability which the operating companies would have paid if they 
had filed a separate return. Then by eliminating the profit through the consolidated return, no 
tax was paid to the government. The holding company had collected the tax and kept it for 
itself. One company collected from its subsidiaries between 1926 and 1929 in excess of one 
and one-half million dollars on this basis. This particular device is probably now defeated by 
withdrawing the privilege of filing consolidated returns. 
  “Elimination of consolidated income-tax returns does not eliminate the necessity for 
auditing these gigantic systems, nor does it make the problem less difficult. Managements 
that are so disposed still find it possible to shift security transactions from one company to 
another for the purpose of allocating losses or profits so as to avoid taxes, and can still 
control and divert earnings from one to another unit in the form of service charges, 
accountancy tax consultant, and management fees, and by various other changes can so 
reduce taxable income of some units and increase net income of others that they can 
accomplish many of the results of consolidated returns. 
  “It is almost impossible, with systems of this magnitude and complexity, to 
determine the tax status of many companies. And, after an audit is made, the situation is 
easily and rapidly changed, to avoid its results. 
  “In 1929, a certain corporation recorded on its books a capital gain in security 
transactions of $18,000,000 which was eliminated through a consolidated return. The Bureau 
found, however, that there was no lawful basis for the consolidated return, and the resulting 
tax was about $2,000,000. However, it was then discovered that a letter, written in 1933, 
purported to confirm what was claimed to have been an oral agreement made in 1929, 
although it had for years been left unwritten. By its terms the two companies declared their 
transactions to be continuing and not to be finally fixed and determined until all taxes were 
finally paid. The object of the device was apparently to prevent the closing of the 
transactions in 1929 and to throw the profit in whatever year was found to be convenient.”
9 
 
The House initially rejected the idea of taxing intercorporate dividends at 15% of the regular 
rate, and the 1935 Act contained a compromise rate of 10%.  Blakey and Blakey (1936) record that 
the 15% figure was implemented in 1936.   
Blakey and Blakey (1935) sum up the Roosevelt administration’s taxation objectives thus:   
                                                           
9 Senate Finance Committee Hearings, pp. 223-224.  
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“There can be no denying that the President’s message was an attack upon wealth; he and his 
followers would say, not upon innocent wealth, but upon concentrated, monopolistic, tax-
evading, unsocial wealth, and particularly upon that taken from the masses by the vicious, 
pyramided, consciousless holding companies.”   
 
That this accurately reflected the view from the White House is also clear.  Roosevelt (1942) 
writes in the America Economic Review,  
“Tax policies should be devised to give affirmative encouragement to competitive enterprise. 
 Attention might be directed to increasing the intercorporate dividend tax to discourage 
holding companies …”.   
 
Roosevelt (1942) clarifies his views: 
“Close financial control, through interlocking spheres of influence over channels of 
investment, and through the use of financial devices like holding companies and strategic 
minority interests, creates close control of the business policies of enterprises which 
masquerade as independent units. 
  “That heavy hand of integrated financial and management control lies upon large 
and strategic areas of American industry. The small-business man is unfortunately being 
driven into a less and less independent position in American life. You and I must admit that. 
  “Private enterprise is ceasing to be free enterprise and is becoming a cluster of 
private collectivisms; masking itself as a system of free enterprise after the American model, 
it is in fact becoming a concealed cartel system after the European model. 
  “We all want efficient industrial growth and the advantages of mass production. No 
one suggests that we return to the hand loom or hand forge. A series of processes involved in 
turning out a given manufactured product may well require one or more huge mass-
production plants. Modern efficiency may call for this. But modern efficient mass production 
is not furthered by a central control which destroys competition between industrial plants 
each capable of efficient mass production while operating as separate units. Industrial 
efficiency does not have to mean industrial empire building. 
  “And industrial empire building, unfortunately, has evolved into banker control of 
industry. We oppose that. 
  “Such control does not offer safety for the investing public. Investment judgment 
requires the disinterested appraisal of other people’s management. It becomes blurred and 
distorted if it is combined with the conflicting duty of controlling the management it is 
supposed to judge. 
  “Interlocking financial controls have taken from American business much of its 
traditional virility, independence, adaptability, and daring–without compensating advantages. 
They have not given the stability they promised. 
  “Business enterprise needs new vitality and the flexibility that comes from the 
diversified efforts, independent judgments and vibrant energies of thousands upon thousands 
of independent businessmen. 
  “The individual must be encouraged to exercise his own judgment and to venture his 
own small savings, not in stock gambling but in new enterprise investment. Men will dare to 
compete against men but not against giants.”  
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Blakey and Blakey (1935) concede that the diverting of taxation from the primary purpose of 
raising revenue to other major purposes involves great hazards.”  However, they justify the 
Roosevelt tax reforms, noting that  
 
“Statesmanship requires that the Ship of State shall not be allowed to rot in a stagnant 
Sargasso Sea nor be rent asunder by explosions of dynamite in its hold nor be dashed upon 
the rocks by the tidal waves of radically revolutionary storms and earthquakes.”   
 
 
In summary, although the tax reforms of the 1930s were unquestionably populist measures 
aimed at big business, the attack not without deliberation.  A purpose of these reforms was to subject 
dividends passed through layers of firms in pyramidal groups to multiple taxation, and thereby 
render such groups unviable.   As the writing style in the American Economic Review deteriorated 
over the decades, so has this purposes been forgotten.   
 
5.  Why Pyramidal Corporate Groups Are Probably Still Undesirable 
This section outlines three economic reasons why pyramidal corporate groups might be 
undesirable.  First, pyramidal groups are statistically associated with corporate governance problems 
in many countries.  Second, pyramidal groups create scope for tax avoidance strategies by 
corporations.  Third, pyramidal groups allow highly concentrated corporate control.  Each is now 
examined in turn.   
 
Pyramids and Corporate Governance 
This section explains the two central agency problems that contribute to poor corporate  
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governance in many US firms, and how an absence of intercorporate dividend taxation magnifies 
both of these genres of agency problems while simultaneously clearing ground for a third new genre. 
 These effects occur because, in the absence of intercorporate dividend taxation, corporations can 
arrange their ownership into pyramidal corporate groups.  It is these pyramidal group structures that 
create scope for broader and deeper corporate governance problems.   
The US corporate finance literature considers two distinguishable, though related agency 
problems that lead to corporate governance problems.   
The first, initially modeled by Jensen and Meckling (1976), occurs in widely held firms - that 
is, firms owned by a large number of small shareholders.  The top executive of such a firm makes 
economically inefficient decisions because she runs the firm so as to maximize her utility, rather 
firm value, as microeconomic theory requires.  This is rational for her because she has little of her 
own wealth invested in the firm she runs.  A standard collective action problem prevents any 
shareholder from spending resources on monitoring and control to prevent this.  Such an agency 
problem will be referred to as an “other people’s money” problem.   
The second genre of agency problem, initially modeled by Stulz (1988), occurs in narrowly 
held firms – that is, firms whose top executive owns a large block of stock.  This equity block gives 
this executive continued control even if she becomes senile, or is no longer the most able person to 
run the firm because technology or conditions change. The controlling shareholder/manager retains 
control because she obtains private benefits of control for which a more able controlling 
shareholder/manager could not compensate her.  Poor corporate governance is thus ‘locked in’ by a 
dominant equity block.  For brevity, this second genre of agency problem will be called a 
“management entrenchment” problem.   
Morck et al. (1988) and others present empirical evidence consistent with one or the other of  
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these genres of agency problem being statistically and economically important corporate governance 
problems in many large US firms.
10   
Morck et al. (2000) and Bebchuk et al. (2000) argue that pyramidal corporate groups create 
scope for agency problems similar to these, and for new sorts of agency problems.   
To see how “other people’s money” problems can arise in pyramidal groups, recall Figure 1. 
 In the absence of any taxes on intercorporate dividends, the family gets 51% of the dividends firm A 
disburses, with the remaining 49% going to public shareholders.  But the family only gets 0.51 x 
0.51 = 26.01% of those paid by B, as 49% go to public shareholders directly, and 49% of the 51% 
paid to firm A also ultimately go to public shareholders.  At successively lower levels of the 
pyramid, the fraction of dividends accruing to the controlling family falls geometrically.   
If firm F pays a $100 dividend, only 0.51
6 x $100 =  $1.76 ends up with the controlling 
family.  The remaining $98.84 accrues, directly or indirectly, to public shareholders.  Thus, firm F, 
like a widely held firm in the United States, is subject to “other people’s money” agency problems of 
the sort described by Jensen and Meckling (1976).  The controlling shareholder only bears 1.76% of 
the cost of poor wasted corporate resources.  The situation is exactly as in a widely held firm where 
the senior managers own only 1.76% of the stock.   
Despite this, firm F is fully controlled by the family.  This is because the family controls 51% 
of the votes in each of the firms above firm F in the chain connecting it to the family firm.  Thus, the 
family’s control over all the firms in the pyramidal group is “entrenched” in the sense of Stulz 
(1988).  The family cannot be dislodged via proxy fights, hostile takeovers, or other mechanisms 
that oust inferior managers in free-standing widely held firms.   
                                                           
10.  Although Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) question the interpretation of this finding, the event study results of 
Fields and Mais (1994) are consistent only with agency problem explanations of the Morck et al. (1988) result.    
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In an economy of free standing firms, like the United States, “other people’s money” agency 
problems occur only in widely held firms, while “entrenchment” problems occur primarily in 
narrowly held firms.  However, in a country whose firms are organized into pyramids, both problems 
can occur concurrently in firms low in the pyramid structure, while all the firms in the pyramid are 
vulnerable to “entrenchment” problems.  This suggests that agency problems in economies whose 
firms are organized into pyramidal groups might be more severe than in economies of freestanding 
firms. 
 
Income Shifting, Corporate Governance and Tax Avoidance 
Finally, and perhaps most important, pyramid groups create scope for a third genre of agency 
problem.  This is because the group firms can transfer income and assets between themselves in 
much the way the subsidiaries of a multinational firm do.  Alworth (1989) and Gresik (2001) 
summarize the abundance of evidence showing that transnational corporations conduct transactions 
where one subsidiary provides goods, services, or capital to another at artificial prices that inflate the 
income of one subsidiary and reduce that of the other.  The objective of these transactions is the 
shifting of income out of high tax jurisdictions and into low tax jurisdictions.   
Bebchuk et al. (2000), Morck et al. (2000), Johnson et al. (2000) and others describe how 
groups of related companies such as the member firms of pyramidal corporate groups can undertake 
analogous non-arm’s length transactions.  The objective can be either avoiding taxes or transferring 
income and assets out of firms whose profits must be shared with public investors and into firms 
whose profits accrue primarily to the controlling shareholder – usually a wealthy family.  Johnson et 
al. (2000) christen income and asset shifting of this sort ‘tunneling’.   
Faccio and Lang (2001), Claessens et al. (2000), Claessens et al. (2002), Bertrand et al.   
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(2002), and others, in studies of East Asian and European pyramidal groups, report abnormally 
lower incomes and dividends in group firms situated nearer the base of the pyramid in Figure 1.  
This is consistent with the view that income is shifted away from firms near the base and towards 
firms near the apex of the pyramid.  The latter are the firms that are most directly related to the 
wealth of the controlling family.   
Of course, income shifting can also be used to avoid taxes.  Harris et al. (1993) and many 
others present empirical evidence that such analogous shifting occurs among the subsidiaries of 
multinational firms in ways consistent with tax avoidance.  The Congress and Administration 
responsible for the 1930s extension of double taxation to intercorporate dividends also believed that 
such income shifting was a serious tax avoidance problem in the United States.   
When tax avoidance and appropriation of public shareholders’ wealth interact, simply 
tunneling income upward in the pyramid may no longer be the controlling shareholders preferred 
strategy.  Note, however, that the goal of tunneling in this context is to maximize the utility of the 
dominant shareholder.   
Critically, Johnson et al. (2000) note that such income shifting is not illegal in many countries 
if the objective is merely to hide income or assets from public investors.  While such transactions 
might be objectionable to US investors, La Porta et al. (2000) show that they are unremarkable, and 
perfectly legal, in many countries.   
 
Political Economy and Pyramids 
Pyramidal corporate groups allow wealthy individuals or families to control corporate assets 
worth vastly more than their actual wealth.  These groups are thus mechanisms that facilitate the 
concentration of corporate control in the hands of a small elite in many developing countries and in  
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continental Europe.   
To see how this comes about, return to Figure 1.  Suppose each firm in the pyramid consists 
of real assets worth $1billion plus financial assets consisting of 51% the stock in two firms in the 
next lower level, down to firms in level F, which each contain only $1 billion in real assets each.  
The firms in level E are each worth $1 billion plus 2 x 0.51 x $1 billion, or $2.02 billion each.  
Those in level D are each worth $1 billion plus 2 x 0.51 x $2.02 billion, or $3.06 billion each.  Those 
in levels C, B, and A are similarly worth $4.12 billion, $5.20 billion and $6.31 billion, respectively.  
The total value of the real assets contained in all the firms in the group is $1 billion times the number 
of firms.  Level A contains two firms, level B contains four, level C contains 8, and so on down to 
level F, which contains 64 firms.  The number of firms is thus 2 + 4 + 8 + 16 + 32 + 64 = 126, and 
the total value of the corporate group is thus $126 billion.  However, the family firm need only hold 
51% of each of the firms in level A, or 2 x 0.51 x $6.31 billion = $6.43 billion worth of stock in 
those firms, to control the $126 corporate group.   
The family thus leverages $6.43 billion of actual wealth into control over $126 billion in real 
corporate assets.  If the family firm also contains real assets, the family’s wealth requirement is 
greater.  If the family allows a minority participation in the family firm, its wealth requirement is 
lower.  If dual class shares, golden shares, or the like are used, the family’s actual wealth can be 
much smaller.   
Of course, the fact that pyramidal groups allow highly concentrated control over a country’s 
corporate section does not necessarily mean that they are social welfare destroying.  Khanna and 
Palepu (1997) point out that managerial talent and reputations for honesty may be scarce 
commodities, and that pyramidal corporate groups allow families possessing these attributes to apply 
them to the management more assets than would be the case if they had to own firms outright to  
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control them.  They argue that such a scarcity is most pronounced in developing countries.   
Khanna and Palepu (1997) and Khanna (2002) also propose that pyramidal business groups 
are substitutes for nonexistent or poorly functioning markets for goods, services, capital, and even 
labor in countries with poor market institutions.  Non-arm’s-length dealings between different firms 
in a pyramidal group are essential for this circumvention of dysfunctional markets.  Thus, in an 
economy with weak institutional support for markets, business groups may be desirable as an 
optimal ‘second best’ approach to organizing economic activity in the sense of Coase (1937) and 
Williamson (1973).   
Hoshi et al. (1990, 1991) argue that such considerations continue to be a factor in Japan, and 
that keiretsu corporate groups there provide financing for their member firms more efficiently than 
would capital markets or unrelated financial institutions.  However, Morck and Nakamura (1999) 
present evidence that agency problems of the sort described above have come to characterize 
keiretsu, and that this ownership structure is probably now an undesirable feature of Japanese 
corporate finance.  As noted above, there are many reasons for expecting pyramidal groups (and 
other cross-holding arrangements such as keiretsu) to suffer such corporate governance problems, 
and a growing body of evidence supports this view.  It is also unclear how the tunneling detected by 
Johnson et al. (2000), Faccio and Lang (2001), Claessens et al. (2000), Claessens et al. (2002), 
Bertrand et al. (2002), and others might be construed as social welfare enhancing.   
In addition, Nenova (2002) and Dyck and Zingales (2002) present evidence consistent with 
the view that dominant shareholders extract large private benefits of control in many economies – 
especially those prone to extensive corruption problems, as measured by La Porta et al. (1996).  
Nenova (2002) shows that voting stock trades at higher prices relative to non-voting stock in more 
corrupt economies.  Dyck and Zingales (2002) show that control blocks trade privately at prices  
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more in excess of the public market price in countries with weaker institutions.  Both studies can be 
explained if controlling shareholders can extract benefits from firms that public shareholders cannot, 
and can do so more readily in economies with weaker institutions.  Most a propos, Dyck and 
Zinglaes (2002) show that the measure of corruption most highly correlated with their estimate of 
the magnitude of private benefits of control is slipshod enforcement of tax laws.  Since more 
vigorous enforcement of tax laws per se renders tunneling more difficult, this finding is consistent 
with tunneling serving as a chief mechanism for the extraction of private benefits by the controlling 
shareholder.   
Dyck and Zinglaes (2002) further show that countries in which private benefits of control are 
higher have less developed financial sectors – especially stock markets.  Since King and Levine 
(1993) and others show that financial sector development is highly correlated with economic growth, 
Dyck and Zingales argue that high private benefits of control are a social welfare problem, and 
hence undesirable.  The association between private benefits of control and tunneling implied by 
their tax enforcement variable suggests, following the same line of reasoning, that pyramidal 
corporate groups constitute a social welfare problem in countries with lax tax enforcement.   
In a widely accepted model of economic growth called creative destruction, Schumpeter 
(1912) argues that the rise of innovative firms destroys stagnant firms. Morck and Yeung (2002) 
argue that very large pyramids that concentrate corporate control in the hands of a few individuals 
also retard growth by undermining the process of Schumpeterian creative destruction.  This occurs if 
the same shareholder controls both firms, and internalizes the cost the innovative firm inflicts upon 
the stagnant firm when calculating the return to innovation.    Consistent with this, Morck et al. 
(2000) find significantly lower private sector investment in innovation in countries with more 
concentrated wealth.    
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A second key determinant of economic growth is the importance of political rent-seeking.  
Krueger (1974) and others argue that economic growth is inhibited by extensive government 
intervention in the economy.  This is because lobbying for government favors can easily become 
more profitable than investment in productivity enhancement in such economies.  The result is an 
increasing flood of capital invested in political connections (corruption) and a dearth of capital in 
research and development, capital spending, etc.  Morck and Yeung (2003) argue that the highly 
concentrated corporate control pyramids allow facilitates political rent seeking by limiting the 
number of actors in the bargaining game between politicians and firms.    
 
6.  The Current Discussion Regarding Dividend Taxation 
A large literature in corporate finance and public economies debates the extent to which the 
U.S. double taxation of dividend income affects share values and distorts savings and investment 
decisions.  In general, the critical issue in this literature is the overall actual level of taxes on 
dividend income, and eliminating double taxation is important only insofar as it lowers that level.  A 
full review is beyond the scope of this study.     
  One set of arguments hinges on double dividend taxation raising the actual tax level on 
dividends and hence depressing share prices, thereby making equity capital unduly expensive and 
retarding corporate investment.  For a discussion of issues regarding the theoretical validity of this 
view, see Auerbach and Hassett (2002).   
Another set of arguments, deriving from Easterbrook (1984) argues that firms prove the high 
quality of their governance to shareholders by paying large and growing dividends.  Again, double 
taxation deters firms from paying such dividends, making it harder for investors to distinguish well-
governed firms from poorly governed ones.  
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The critical insight, as regards both sets of arguments, is that the current intercorporate 
dividend double taxation regime can generate no revenue from free-standing firms – the sorts of 
companies of which the US corporate sector is currently composed.  This is because freestanding 
firms pay no intercorporate dividends.  This is the whole point, for the purpose of the tax is to 
prevent pyramidal corporate groups by placing a heavier tax burden on them than on other 
companies, not to raise money.  Thus, intercorporate dividend taxes sufficient to prevent pyramiding 
can have no effect on corporate valuation, investment policy, or payout policy of existing or new 
firms.    
This reasoning implies that the double, or multiple taxation of intercorporate dividends be 
viewed in an entirely different light from double taxation of dividends paid by companies to 
individual shareholders.  Nonetheless, the current proposals for ending the double taxation of 
dividend income in the United States fail to make this distinction.   
The statement outlining the Bush administrations plans to end double taxation, as circulated 
by the Treasury Department in 2003, reads 
 
Under the proposal, an excludable dividend received by a U.S. corporation will not 
be taxable. Excludable dividends received by a corporation will increase the recipient 
corporation's EDA (excludable dividend amount) and will, therefore, remain 
excludable when distributed by the recipient corporation.   
 
2003 Blue Book, p. 20.
11 
 
That is, from now on in the United States, Company E in Figure 1can claim dividend income 
received from Company F as “excludable dividend income”, on which Company E need pay no 
corporate income tax.  In turn, Company E can forward the dividend income to Company D without D 
                                                           
11 United States Department of the Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2004 Revenue 
Proposals (The 2003 Blue Book) is available on-line at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/bluebk03.pdf.   
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incurring any tax liability, and so on, all the way up to the apex firm of the pyramid.  
Under the current US tax rules, pyramids like that in Figure 1 are prohibitively expensive 
because of double intercorporate dividend taxation.  Under the Treasury Department’s proposed 
changes, the pyramidal structure in Figure 1 would appear to entail no additional taxes at all.  This 
section of the Tax Reform Proposal would seem to indicate that the Bush administration plans to end all 
intercorporate dividend taxation.  However, the administration’s position is rendered ambiguous in the 
next paragraph.   
Returning to Table 1, current US law taxes dividends received at a statutory rate of 35%.  For 
intercorporate dividends, such as those paid by the firms in Figure 1, this rate is reduced to 7%.  This 
reduction is accomplished by allowing the recipient corporation a “dividends received deduction” 
equal to 80% of the dividends it receives in cases where the recipient firm owns between twenty and 
eighty percent of the dividend paying firm.  As Table 1 shows, only if the recipient’s stake exceeds 
eighty percent is a one hundred percent deduction allowed.  The administration’s reform proposal 
explains that 
Under current law, a corporation that receives a dividend from another corporation is 
entitled to a dividends received deduction. Under the proposal, the 100 percent 
deduction for dividends received from a corporation 80 percent or more of which is 
owned by another corporation will be retained. The 70 and 80 percent deductions for 
dividends received, however, will only be available for distributions of pre-2001 
earnings and profits that are distributed before January 1, 2006, with respect to stock 
issued before February 3, 2003.   
 
2003 Blue Book p. 20. 
 
One reading of this paragraph is that the partial “dividends received deductions” will be 
eliminated because the EDA rules allow the equivalent of a one hundred percent deduction in all 
cases.  Another is that the EDA will only be available to the recipient if its stake in the dividend-
paying firm exceeds eighty percent.  The elimination of the partial deductions might then be read as  
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implying full double taxation of intercorporate dividends in all other cases.     
Resolution of this ambiguity may lie in a different paragraph outlining the overall objective 
of the reforms as regards intercorporate dividend taxation.  The Treasury Department seems aware 
that these changes will allow pyramidal corporate groups in the United States, for the proposal states  
 
These additions to EDA will ensure that multiple levels of corporate ownership do 
not result in more than one level of tax on income that has been previously taxed at 
the corporate level. 
 
2003 Blue Book, p. 14. 
 
 
Although this phrasing does not explicitly address the ambiguity of the proposal in its current 
form, an interpretation consistent with this philosophy favors the view that all intercorporate 
dividends are to be exempted from double taxation.12  This would align US taxation of 
intercorporate dividends with that of other countries, such as Canada’s regime described in Table 1, 
and would remove the current tax penalty on pyramidal groups.   
If intercorporate dividend taxes are the primary reason pyramidal groups do not exist in the 
United States, this change opens the door to their establishment in that country.  If such groups do 
not form despite the absence of tax disincentives, economists will have an interesting puzzle to 
analyze.  Work on other countries suggests that the formation of pyramidal groups in the United 
States would probably have deleterious effects on US corporate governance, corporate tax 
compliance, and on the concentration of corporate control, though these effects are not certain.   
 
7.  Conclusions 
                                                           
12 A private communication with Glen Hubbard, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors to President George W. 
Bush while the tax reform plans were drawn up confirms this interpretation.    
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This paper neither promotes nor criticizes any particular policy agenda.  Its purpose is to emphasize 
that the economic arguments surrounding the double or multiple taxation of intercorporate dividends 
differ starkly from those surrounding the double taxation of dividends paid to individuals, and that 
the current US dividend tax reform proposals do not make this distinction. 
  In the 1930s, the Congress and President that originally extended double (and multiple) 
taxation to intercorporate dividends believed that pyramidal groups wrought problems of corporate 
governance, tax avoidance, and concentrated corporate control.  The current discussion about 
eliminating the double taxation of dividend income should be informed by a historical understanding 
of why the double (and multiple) taxation of intercorporate dividends was initiated.     
Pyramidal corporate groups exist in virtually all countries that do not tax intercorporate 
dividends.  Empirical research on the financial systems of such countries indicates that these groups 
create scope for the abuse of public shareholders.  The US experience prior to the 1930s reforms and 
empirical work on multinational firms with similar structures to those of pyramidal groups suggests 
that pyramidal groups offer considerable potential for corporate tax avoidance.  And pyramidal 
corporate groups allow an extreme concentration of economic power.  These are the structures that 
allow tiny elites to control the greater parts of the corporate sectors of many Latin American, Asian, 
and European countries.   
It is not clear that abolishing the double (and multiple) taxation of intercorporate dividends 
would lead to such outcomes in the United States.  Vigorous actions by the Internal Revenue Service 
to prevent transfer pricing and income shifting in related-party intercorporate transactions might 
prevent effective tunneling.  Shareholder activism in the United States could also prevent controlling 
shareholders in corporate groups from extracting private benefits of control.  And the depth of 
democracy in the US might mitigate problems associated with excessive concentration of corporate  
27 
control in the hands of a small elite.   
Moreover, other restrictions on pyramiding remain.  For example, the Public Utilities 
Holding Company Act (PUHCA) of 1935 restricts large pyramidal groups holdings of public utilities 
such as power or water companies.  Starting in 1920, the number of electric power firms declined 
dramatically because of pyramiding.
13  Utilities throughout the country came under the control of a 
small number of holding companies, which themselves were owned by other holding companies. As 
many as ten layers separated the top and bottom of some pyramids. By 1932, three groups controlled 
45% of the electricity generated in the United States. Responding to evidence of tunneling, poor 
governance, monopolistic pricing, and the failure of many highly levered pyramids subsequent to 
1929, Congress enacted PUHCA, subjecting utilities to federal regulation and banning pyramids 
more than two layers high in that industry.
14   
Nonetheless, the strength of these other factors vis à vis intercorporate dividend taxation is 
unknown.  Utility companies are important elements of some pyramidal groups in other countries, 
but pyramids can certainly exist without encompassing utilities.  Moreover, most public utilities in 
the US are now exempt from PUHCA because they operate within a single state. Vigorous tax 
enforcement, corporate governance activism, and grassroots democracy might also prevent 
pyramiding, or limit its impact.  But this is far from certain.  The full consequences of abolishing 
double and multiple intercorporate dividend taxation in the United States are ill understood at best.    
While substantive economic arguments support the abolition of double taxation on dividends 
paid to individual investors, there is no compelling reason to end the double taxation of 
intercorporate dividends.   Nonetheless, the current US proposal for eliminating double taxation does 
                                                           
13 Abel (1999).  
28 
not distinguish double taxation of intercorporate dividends from double dividend taxation in general. 
  
Abolishing the double (and multiple) taxation of intercorporate dividends could have 
sweeping consequences for corporate governance, corporate taxation, and corporate control.  If the 
Treasury Department intends to permit pyramidal corporate groups in the United States, research on 
the desirability of this reform should be an urgent priority.  If pyramidal groups are deemed 
undesirable, more nuanced tax reforms can readily be envisioned that continue subjecting 
intercorporate dividends to double and multiple taxation while eliminating the double taxation of 
dividends paid by free-standing corporations to individuals.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
14 Title I §11b (the "Death Sentence Clause") forbids holding companies more than twice removed from an operating 
subsidiary.  Deregulation of the power industry in the 1990s left the pyramiding   
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Table 1.  Top Personal and Corporate Federal Tax Rates Payable on Dividend Income 
in the United States and Canada, as of 2002 
 
                    United States                      Canada 
  










0 - 10%  35%  38.6%  10.5% 38.62%  31.34%  38.62% 
10 - 20%  35%  38.6%  10.5% 38.62%  31.34%  0% 
20 - 80%  35%  38.6%  7% 38.62%  31.34%  0% 
80% +  35%  38.6%  0% 38.62%  31.34%  0% 
 
a.  Top marginal rate, federal taxes only 
b.  Combined federal and Ontario rates.  Ontario is chosen as a representative provincial tax system.  
Provincial taxes are a larger fraction of the total in Canada and meaningful comparisons with other 
countries cannot exclude them. 




Table 2.  Tax Rates on Intercorporate Dividend Income From Controlled Publicly 
Traded Firms Effective in Various Countries in 1982 and 1997 and Existence of 
Pyramiding 
Country 
Intercorporate dividend  
tax rate 
Pyramidal or other group 
members among top 10 firms  
Argentina 0%  yes 
Australia 0%  yes 
Austria 0%  yes 
Belgium 0%  yes 
Brazil 0%  yes 
Canada 0%  yes 
Chile
  0% yes 
Denmark 0%  yes 
Finland 0%  yes 
France 0%  yes 
Germany 0%  yes 
Greece 0%  yes 
Hong Kong  0%  yes 
India*
  0% yes 
Indonesia 0%  yes 
Ireland 0%  yes 
Italy 0%  yes 
Japan 0%  yes 
Korea**    0%*  yes 
Malaysia 0%  yes 
Mexico 0%  yes 
Netherlands 0%  yes 
New Zealand  0%  yes 
Norway 0%  yes 
Portugal 0%  yes 
Singapore 0%  yes 
Spain 0%  yes 
Sweden   0%  yes 
Switzerland 0%  yes 
Thailand 0%  yes 
United Kingdom  0%  no 
United States  7.0%  no 
Sources:  Tax rate information is from International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation tax code summaries, Price 
Waterhouse Tax Information booklets, and telephone and other discussions with accountants in various countries.  
Group structure information is based on data provided by Rafael La Porta, annual reports, and telephone and other 
discussions with bankers and finance academics from various countries.   
 
*    Intercorporate dividends are exempted for firms on special lists in India.   
**  Intercorporate dividends are tax exempt in Korea  for officially recognized Chaebol member firms only.  Other firms 
are subject to a 33% to 40% tax on intercorporate dividends.  
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Figure 1.  A Stylized Representation of a Pyramidal Corporate Group  
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Note:  Firms not controlled via majority equity blocks are controlled via director interlock, dual class shares, or other means. 





















































































































Figure 4.  Typical Large Publicly Traded Corporations Outside the US:  Firms Controlled by the Agnelli Family in Italy 
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(19.42% O; 32.83% C)
IFI S.p.A.
(41.23% O; 82.45% C)





Source:  Faccio and Lang (2001).    
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Figure 5.  Typical Large Publicly Traded Corporations Outside the US:  The Deutsche Bank Group in Germany 
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Source:  Faccio and Lang (2001).  
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